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Dynamic Pricing; A Learning Approach
Abstract
We present an optimization approach for jointly learning the demand as a function
of price, and dynamically setting prices of products in an oligopoly environment in order
to maximize expected revenue. The models we consider do not assume that the demand
as a function of price is known in advance, but rather assume parametric families of
demand functions that are learned over time. We first consider the noncompetitive
case and present dynamic programming algorithms of increasing computational inten-
sity with incomplete state information for jointly estimating the demand and setting
prices as time evolves. Our computational results suggest that dynamic programming
based methods outperform myopic policies often significantly. We then extend our anal-
ysis in a competitive environment with two firms. We introduce a more sophisticated
model of demand learning, in which the price elasticities are slowly varying functions
of time, and allows for increased flexibility in the modeling of the demand. We pro-
pose methods based on optimization for jointly estimating the Firm's own demand, its
competitor's demand, and setting prices. In preliminary computational work, we found
that optimization based pricing methods offer increased expected revenue for a firm
independently of the policy the competitor firm is following.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study pricing mechanisms for firms competing for the same products in
a dynamic environment. Pricing theory has been extensively studied by researchers from
a variety of fields over the years. These fields include, among others, economics (see for
example, [361), marketing (see for example, [25]), revenue management (see for example,
[27]) and telecommunications (see for example, [21], [22], [29], [32], [33]). In recent years,
the rapid development of information technology, the Internet and E-commerce has had
very strong influence on the development of pricing and revenue management.
The overall goal of this paper is to address the problem of setting prices for a firm in
both noncompetitive and competitive environments, in which the demand as a function of
price is not known, but is learned over time. A firm produces a number of products which
require (and compete for in the competitive case) scarce resources. The products must be
priced dynamically over a finite time horizon, and sold to the appropriate demand. Our
research (contrasted with traditional revenue management) considers pricing decisions, and
takes capacity as given.
Problem Characteristics
The pricing problem we will focus on in this paper has a number of characteristics:
(a) The demand as a function of price is unknown a priori and is learned over time. As
a result, part of the model we develop in this paper deals with learning the demand
as the firm acquires more information over time. That is, we exploit the fact that
over time firms are able to acquire knowledge regarding demand behavior that can be
utilized to improve profitability. Much of the current research does not consider this
aspect but rather considers demand to be an exogenous stochastic process following a
certain distribution. See [7], [8], [10], [11], [16], [17], [19], [29].
(b) Products are priced dynamically over a finite time horizon. This is an important aspect
since the demand and the data of the problem evolve dynamically. There exists a great
deal of research that does not consider the dynamic and the competitive aspects of
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the pricing problem jointly. An exception to this involves some work that applies
differential game theory (see [1], [2], [9]).
(c) We explicitly allow competition in an oligopolistic market, that is, a market character-
ized by a few firms on the supply side, and a large number of buyers on the demand
side. A key feature of such a market (in contrast to a monopoly) is that the profit one
firm receives depends not just on the prices it sets, but also on the prices set by the
competing firms. That is, there is no perfect competition in an oligopolistic market
since decisions made by all the firms in the market impact the profits received by each
firm. One can consider a cooperative oligopoly (where firms collude) or a noncooper-
ative oligopoly. In this paper we focus on the latter. The theory of oligopoly dates
back to the work of Augustin Cournot [12], [13], [14].
(d) We consider products that are perishable, that is, there is a finite horizon to sell
the products, after which any unused capacity is lost. Moreover, the marginal cost
of an extra unit of demand is relatively small. For this reason, our models in this
paper ignore the cost component in the decision-making process and refer to revenue
maximization rather than profit maximization.
Application Areas
There are many markets where the framework we consider in this paper applies. Exam-
ples include airline ticket pricing. In this market the products the consumers demand, are
the origin-destination (O-D) pairs during a particular time window. The resources are the
flight legs (more appropriately seats on a particular flight leg) which have limited capacity.
There is a finite horizon to sell the products, after which any unused capacity is lost (per-
ishable products). The airlines compete with one another for the product demand which
is of stochastic nature. Other industries sharing the same features include the service in-
dustry (for example, hotels, car rentals, and cruise-lines), the retail industry (for example,
department stores) and finally, pricing in an e-commerce environment. All these industries
attempt to intelligently match capacity with demand via revenue management. A review
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of the huge literature in revenue management can be found in [27], [34] and [35].
Contributions
(a) We develop pricing mechanisms when there is incomplete demand information, by
jointly setting prices and learning the firm's demand without assuming any knowledge
of it in advance.
(b) We introduce a model of demand learning, in which the price elasticities are slowly
varying functions of time. This model allows for increased flexibility in the modeling
of the demand. We propose methods based on optimization for jointly estimating the
Firm's own demand, its competitor's demand, and setting prices.
Structure
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we focus on the dynamic
pricing problem in a non-competitive environment. We consider jointly the problem of
demand estimation and pricing using ideas from dynamic programming with incomplete
state information. We present an exact algorithm as well as several heuristic algorithms
that are easy to implement and discuss the various resulting pricing policies. In Section 3,
we extend our previous model to also incorporate the aspect of competition. We propose
an optimization approach to perform the firm's own demand estimation, its competitor's
price prediction and finally its own price setting. Finally, in Section 4, we conclude with
conclusions and open questions.
2 Pricing in a Noncompetitive Environment
In this section we consider the dynamic pricing problem in a non-competitive environment.
We focus on a market with a single product and a single firm with overall capacity c over
a time horizon T. In the beginning of each period t, the firm knows the previous price and
demand realizations, that is, dl, .. ., dt_- and pi, .. .,pt-1. This is the data available to the
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firm. In this section, we assume that the firm's true demand is an unknown linear function
of the form
dt = 0 + plpt + t,
that is, it depends on the current period prices Pt, unknown parameters p30, 1 and a
random noise t N(O, a2). The firm's objectives are to estimate its demand dynamically
and set prices in order to maximize its total expected revenue. Let P =[Pmin,Pmax] be the
set of feasible prices.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 we present a demand estimation
model. In Section 2.2, we consider the joint demand estimation and pricing problem through
a dynamic programming formulation. Using ideas from dynamic programming with incom-
plete state information, we are able to reduce this dynamic programming formulation to
an eight-dimensional one. Nevertheless, this formulation is still difficult to solve, and we
propose an approximation that allows us to further reduce the problem to a five dimensional
dynamic program. In Section 2.3 we separate the demand estimation from the pricing prob-
lem and consider several heuristic algorithms. In particular, we consider a one-dimensional
dynamic programming heuristic as well as a myopic policy heuristic. To gain intuition, we
find closed form solutions in the deterministic case. Finally, in Section 2.4 we consider some
examples and offer insights.
2.1 Demand Estimation
As we mentioned at time t the firm has observed the previous price and demand realizations,
that is, d,. . ., dt-1 and p, . . ., Pt- and assumes a linear demand model dt = /3°+,lpt+ t,
with t N(O, a 2). The parameters ,0, 1l and a are unknown and are estimated as follows.
We denote by x = [1, p]' and by ts the vector of the parameter estimates at time
s, (,o, ). We estimate this vector of the demand parameters through the solution of the
least square problem,
t-1
/Ot = arg min (ds -xsr) 2 , t = 3,..., T. (1)
s=1
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Proposition 1 : The least squares estimates (1) can be generated by the following iterative
process
t,t- -- + Ht lXt-1 (dt-1 - t_l -l), t- = 3, .. , T
where 02 is an arbitrary vector, and the matrices Htl are generated by
Ht- = Ht-2 + t-1Xt-l, t = 3, . . .,T,
t-1
t-1 ,p3
s=l
t-l t-l
s =1 s=1 S=1 
with HI = 1 p 
pl p[
Therefore, Ht-1 =
Proof: The first order conditions of the least squares problem for fit and t-1 respectively,
imply that
-XA4t) Xs -= (2)
t-1
c (ds
s=l
- xst) x = 0. (3)
t-2
E (ds
s=l
If we write, t = !,t-1 + a, where a is some vector, it follows from (2) that
This in turn implies that,
t-2
> (: - Xs/t-i
s=1
- a) x, (dt -- Xt_ - x a Xtla O.
Therefore, a = H-llxtl (dt- 1 tlx/tl), with Ht-1 = E" (x-x) =t- - - t- I s=l s)
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t-1
c (d - Xt-l
s=l
- x'a) x, = 0.
Subtracting (3) from (4) we obtain that
t-1
E (Xs a ) Xs (dt
s=1
(4)
[ t-1s=1 t-1E Pss=lt-1E ps=l I1
t-1 t-)xtljI1
Given d,..., dt_1 and Pl,... ,Pt- 1, the least squares estimates are
t-1 t-1 t-2 t- t-l
Sr1 s=10 sll t-l 2 8 - - ll _ t (t - 1)Z p2 - ( t l
s=l s=l-
The matrix Ht-_ is singular, and hence not invertible, when
t-1 t 2
t p =(s)P (5)
Notice that the only solution to the above equality is P1 = P2 = P- = t-1. If the matrix
Ht-1 is nonsingular, then the inverse is
H-1Ht- 1 =
t-1
Ep
s=l
t-1
- Es
$=1
(t--l)Ep2_ Ps (t-i)pP 2 Ps )
t-- 
s=l t-1I =. t-
t-l ( \t-l 2
(t-l) P - Ps
t-l t-l 2
t-)E P - Ps
s=1 s=l
Therefore,
t-1Ep2
s=l
t- t- l 
(t-l)C Ep2- P
t-1
s=l
$--1 \1
t-1
-EPa
s=l
s=l \=1
t-i
t-1) P --l
(t-l) E$p2-1 P3
Ept-il
t-2 t-2
s P2 -Pt-1 T Ps
-=l s=l
t- 1t- 1 \2
(t--) p2-- E Ps)
t-2
(t-2)pt-1 - E Ps
a=1
(t-) =1 2- p,)
I=l s -l
As a result, we can express the estimates of the demand parameters in period t in terms of
earlier estimates as
[ 0 [ - ]
,tlt-i)
t-2 t-2
, P2-Pt-, $ Pa
(t t-1 p - 1 2
t-2
a=I 1 \ = /
(t-1)P t- l - P
s=1
s=l k=l
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H-1 xt-1 =
The estimate for the variance a at time t is given by
1 t -
Notice that the variance estimate is based on t - 1 pieces of data, with two parameters
already estimated from the data, hence there are t - 3 degrees of freedom. Such an estimate
is unbiased (see [30]).
2.2 An Eight-Dimensional DP for Determining Pricing Policies
The difficulty in coming up with a general framework for dynamically determining prices
is that the parameters 3° and 31 of the true demand are not directly observable. What is
observable though are the realizations of demand and price in the previous periods, that
is, dl, ..., dt-1 and Pl,..., pt-1. This seems to suggest that ideas from dynamic program-
ming with incomplete state information may be useful (see [3]). As a first step in this
direction, during the current period t, we consider a dynamic program with state space
(dl, ..., dt-, pi, ... ptl, ct), control variable the current price Pt and randomness coming
from the noise t. We observe though that as time t increases, the dimension of the state
space becomes huge and therefore, solving this dynamic programming formulation is not
possible. In what follows we will illustrate that we can considerably reduce the high dimen-
sionality of the state space.
First we introduce the notation, gs,t (t, ' ) s = , . . . , T, which is the current
time t estimate of the parameters for future times s = t, . . .,T. Notice that ft,t = ft.
Similarly to Proposition 1, we can update our least squares estimates through t+l,t =
/3 t,t + Ht-xt (bt - X{,t,t) . Notice that since in the beginning of period t demand dt is not
known, we replaced it with Dt = j + btlpt + t. As a result, vector t+l,t is a random
variable. A useful observation we need to make is that in order to calculate matrix Ht we
t-1 t-1
need to keep track of the quantities E p2 and 2 PT. These will be as a result part of the
-=1 - =1
state space in the new dynamic programming formulation.
It is natural to assume that the variance estimates change with time and do not remain
constant in future periods. This is the case since the estimate of the variance will be affected
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by the prices. That is,
N (o )
S2 =1 = t3 . .,T.
This observation implies that we need to find a way to estimate the variance for the future
periods from the current one. We denote by 2+l the estimate (in the current period, t)
of next period's variance.
Proposition 2 : The estimate of next period's variance in the current period t is given by,
t-1 t-1 0 t-1 22(t3) + (t + + 2 /3t° ds + 2- (t - 1) 2°) , ^l> d ... , t/t Pp-  p
2 s=l s=l s=l s=l
t+l,t - t2
- t-1 (6)
t + P'Pt)- + t2 + 20/3 tpt + 2+tt - 20/3ptet - 2t+1 ds
t-2 +
t- 2 t-1
-2t+ 1/pt - 2t+l,St Pt2 - 2,t+lpt-t ( )2d,
t- 2+
>7 ps±2t+l !s + Ldt+l3t+ipt ( (tl+l)?p2± (A ) 2 p2t-2t - 2 ^
-t+l t C , (-13- 3t+,tPt -2~8 +lt q- 5rs /t°
Proof: As a first step we relate quantities -J2 = with al = t-2
By expanding the second equation and separating the period t terms from the previous pe-
riod t - 1 we obtain
t-1 t-1 t-1
>7 d + dt-2t+l d, - 2t+ldt - 2,t+l > p5d5 - 23t+lptdt
--2 s-----1
t+ -2 s (7)
t -
10
Recall that t _
t-1
E (d5,-0O 1, sl)p2
s= 1 3 . This gives rise to,t-3
t-1 t-1
Yds = 2 (t-3) +2,°Zds
s=l s=l
t-1
-2r3 t ZPs -
s=1
We substitute (8) into (7) to obtain
-3 t-° d+ t--1Q(t- 3) + 2/° E ds + 2/2 1 dp, - (t- 1) P)
s=1 s=l
t-2
t-1l t-1l
d- 23+1 Z ds - 2°+lddt - 23', E pd,
s=l s=l
2 EP1 ps - ()2 t1-p2
s=l s=l
- 2l+lptdt +t (/t°+l)2
t-2
t-1 2 t-
2 ti j t1/ j t p, + 2!t ±1jt 1pt + ( ± ) t 2 +: ^1
s=l s=l
+
(1 2
( 8t+) Pt
t-2
Nevertheless, in the beginning of period t, dt is not known. Therefore, we replace in the
previous equation, each occurrence of dt with Dt = 0/3 + tPt +Et. This leads us to conclude
that
t-1
^a(t L- 3) + 2 ds
s=l
t-1
+ 2tl E dp, - (t
s=l
t-2
(t°)) 2 + t Fpt)p + 2 + P -2 &t 2 tt-2 + 1 d
-1-'+( (tPt) 2 1 +20 2/..tlpt /~t + ilpte t 2t+j tt-s=l
-T
t-2
3=1 +
-2
0''1 t-  ( 2t-12/ ~ 1 Q p 0 "1 22,3t+ 1t+1 Ps + 2t+lpt+1 Pt + (,t+) = p
s=l s=l
t-2
.
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t-1
+ s d=,p
s=l
2t-1
s=l
(8)
-2
t+ 1 +
t2lt 
t+ 1,t -
- 21) 13° - ), t-1 
-1) t - 2 Z p 3$=1
2 t-l
s=1
2PS
1-
+ t+ ) Ptt
2
- (t - 1) Pto )
This proposition suggests that in order to estimate the next period variance from the
current one, we need to keep track of the following quantities
t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1
~t,? Si 7 5p , pr, 5pd 9 d,, :ay
Tr=1 7=1 7=1 T=1
This observation allows us to provide an eight-dimensional dynamic programming formula-
tion with state space given by,
^Ol 2 E p,d , E
T=1 7=1 7=1 r=l
We are now able to formulate the following dynamic program where the control is the
price and the randomness is the noise.
An Eight-Dimensional DP Pricing Policy
JT(CT, 4, 4T, T) = max E, [PT min{( T+ TPT+ ET) CT}]
fors = max{3, t},...,T-1
s-1 s-1 s-1 s-1
J5(c5 , iot it, , p P, 5prdw , 54 dE, l&2)
7=1 7=1 r=l r=1
max E [pS min { ( ,ps + e c CS
/ . (f / n ^, - + 
+Js+1
I /-- min I u 4 fliln_ 4-r) I r_ rr'
-,-s°+11 p+l
s-1 s-iT, p2+, Zp +p5] P~ + P], p, + Ps,
T=1 7=1
T pd +S (yt+1P 5 +cEs)
r=l1
T=1
i ,2,
-"s+i
11
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(1 ,.
where
s-1 s--i
r=1 r=1
40O+i ,So I s -E p 2[L ^+' i. > ^ s E p2 +2-( A PrP2
s-i--1
r=l
with noise . N(O, a2) and variance ^2 given from the recursive formula in (6).
Notice that in the DP recursion s is ranging from max{3, t} to T - 1. This is because
in the expression for +2 we divide by s - 2. Intuitively, we need at least three data points
in order to estimate three parameters. When t = 1, the denominator in the expression for
a2+1 should also be one, while when t = 2 the denominator can be chosen to be either one
or two.
2.3 A Five-Dimensional DP for Determining Pricing Policies
Although the previous DP formulation is the correct framework for determining pricing
policies, it has an eight-dimensional state space which makes the problem computationally
intractable. For this reason we consider in this section an approximation that gives rise
to a lower dimensional dynamic program that is computationally tractable. In particular,
we relax the assumption that the noise at time t changes in time and is affected by future
pricing decisions. In particular, we consider
65 N (0, a2), s =t, ...,T
t-1 (d -Xp)2
^2 r=l
Ct = t-3
Moreover, as in the previous section
,t+i,t = Ptt + HT xt (t - xtt
t-1 t-1
To calculate the matrix Ht we need to keep track of the quantities E pI and E pi.
=l m=1
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This gives rise to a dynamic programming formulation with state variables,
s-1 s-1X
es5, , , E, = (9)
r=1 ~=1
A Five-Dimensional DP Pricing Policy
JT (CT , r) = maP ECT [PTmin{(4 + PT + ST), CT}
for s = t,...,T- l:
(cs - min{ + Ps + Es) , Cs },
+JS+1 ,S+11 +1
E p2 + p2, EP + Pt
r=l r=
with
--1 s-1
r=
so-l 
--- 1
s p 2+sp2- p +p
r=l =1
s-1
(s--1 )p5 - > pr
s, P2 +SP T-- Pr+ps)
-- !-
2.4 Pricing Heuristics
In the previous two subsections we considered two dynamic programming formulations for
determining pricing policies. The first was an exact formulation with an eight-dimensional
state space that was computationally intractable, while the second was an approximation
with a five-dimensional state space that is more tractable. Nevertheless, although this latter
approach is tractable it is still fairly complex to solve. Both of these formulations were based
on the idea of performing jointly the demand estimation with the pricing problem. In this
section, we consider two heuristics that are approximations but yet are computationally
very easy to perform. They are based on the idea of separating the demand estimation
from the pricing problem.
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O'+1 = 3, +E
One-Dimensional DP Pricing Policy
In the beginning of period t, the firm computes the estimates o and OI and solves a one-
dimensional dynamic program assuming that these parameter estimates are valid over all
future periods. That is, this heuristic approach ignores the fact that these estimates will in
fact be affected by the current pricing decisions. In particular,
ds = Ot Ps+s S = t,...,T
P sN(0, 2), s=...,T
with
> 2
t = t-3
s=1
Subsequently, the firm solves the following dynamic program in the beginning of period t
(t = 1,...,T),
JT(CT) = maxE, [Tmin { (fl+ P3T +T) , CT}]
PTEP L]
for s = t, .. ,T-l 
Ps min f i + /tps + s) , cs +
Js (s) = - max in+ ( (P + ; , c})
In this dynamic programming formulation the remaining capacity represents the state space,
the prices are the controls and the randomness comes from the noise.
Deterministic One-Dimensional DP Policy
To gain some intuition, in what follows we examine the deterministic case (that is, when
the noise cs = 0). As a result, after having computed the estimates /o and 1, the firm
solves the following DP in the beginning of period t (t = 1, .. ., T),
JT(cT) = max PT min {( +PT) , T}
fors = t,...,T-1:
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J (cs) = max Ps min{ (I + tps) cs}
+Js+l (cs- min { (t + ps), cs}) 
This deterministic one-dimensional DP policy has a closed form solution. We establish
its solution in two parts. Since the dynamic program is deterministic, an optimal solution
is given by an open-loop policy (that is, we can solve for an optimal price path versus an
optimal pricing policy, i.e. there is no dependence on the state). For the proofs that follow,
we need to introduce the following definition.
Definition 1 A price vector p = (Pt,.. .,PT)I leads to premature stock-out if
T
e ( tiPs) i>Ct.
s=t
Lemma 1 The optimal solution given by the one-dimensional DP is unique and satisfies
Pt = ... = PT
Proof: First we will show that any optimal solution must satisfy Pt = . = PT, then we
will prove uniqueness. Suppose there exists an optimal solution p* for which the above does
not hold. Then at least two of the prices are different and at least one price is less than
Pmax. Without loss of generality, assume that Pt =# Pt+l (the argument holds for any two
prices). We will show that such a solution cannot be optimal. Next we will show that the
optimal solution must satisfy,
T T
(01+i *s) < Ct.
sot s=t
This is true since otherwise we could increase at least one of the prices by a small
amount (since at least one is strictly less than Pmax), and achieve greater revenue by selling
the same number of units ct at a slightly higher average price (contradicting the optimality
of the solution). Therefore, the firm does not expect a premature stock-out and the optimal
T(
objective value is given by, z* = E p* ( + P*) . Notice that the revenue generated in
s=t
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periods t and t + 1 is given by,
Pt (I? + 4Pt) + Pt+ (I + P*t )
* +1 +l ((t)2 + (Pt+) ) (10)
p*+p 1In what follows, consider setting price 2Ptt+l in periods t and t+ 1. Therefore, the revenue
generated in periods t and t + 1 is given by,
fo ·' ± .± -t 0 +* * 2. (11)
~tp + tp*+l + 0t (Pt + t+) 2
Comparing (11) with (10) we notice that the total revenue has been increased. This is
a contradiction. Hence, any optimal solution must satisfy Pt = ... = PT
Next we demonstrate uniqueness. Suppose there exist two optimal solutions pl and p2
of dimension T - t + 1, where pl = (pl, . .. , p l), p2 = (p2 ,...,p2).
We consider three possibilities. First suppose that both price vectors lead to premature
stock-out. The respective revenues are given by ctp' and ctp2 . Since pl _ p2, it follows that
ctpl 7& Ctp 2, (since ct > 0). Therefore, it cannot be the case that both pl and p2 are optimal
(which is a contradiction).
Next suppose that exactly one price vector, say pl, leads to premature stock-out. We
know that for such a price vector to be optimal it must be the case that pl = Pmax, since
otherwise we could increase pl by a small amount and improve the objective. Moreover,
p2 < Pmax (since p2 :$ pl). Therefore p2 also leads to premature stock out (contradicting
the assumption that exactly one price vector leads to premature stock-out).
Finally suppose that neither price vector leads to premature stock-out. In this case,
the respective revenue (objective) is given by,
Z1 p (t + p) (T- -t + 1), Z2 = Z =p2 (- ) (T-t + 1)
Consider the price vector p' (of dimension T - t + 1) with each component given by,
p+p2L. Since pl and p2 do not lead to premature stock-out, neither does p'. In which case2
the revenue is given by,
z +)
2 t 2 -
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After some algebra (and since z2 = z1 ) we find that, z' = z1 - (pl _ p2)2 (T - t + 1).
Notice that z' > z. Therefore, pl and p2 cannot be optimal (contradiction). Hence, the
optimal solution is unique. E
We use this result to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Under the assumption that 30 + tPm ax > 0 (that is, demand cannot be neg-
ative), in the deterministic case the one-dimensional DP offers the following closed form
solution
p: = max 1, T.
However, if the above solution exceeds Pmax then p* = Pmax, while if the above solution
is less than Pmin then p* = Pmin.
Proof: Consider the following price, p = argmaxpepp (+ 1lp). Notice that since
'31 < 0 and the price set is continuous,
-| t if Pmin < < Pmax
2i' -^ 2i-
if- < Pmin  p
Pmax if- 4 > Pmax
The objective value z (total revenue) is the sum of each period's revenue. Letting zs
denote the revenue from period s, implies that z < pl (/3 + 31pp) , for all s = t, .. , T.
Therefore, the total revenue is bounded, z pl ( 3+ ±31pl) (T - t + 1) . We consider three
cases:
CASE 1: Suppose that (3 + 3p') ( - t + 1) < ct. In this case the firm could set the
price pi over each period and achieve revenue pl (0? + tlpl) (T-t + 1). Therefore, the
objective's upper bound has been achieved and hence the solution (pl,...,pl) is optimal.
CASE 2: Suppose that (it + tlpmax) (T - t + 1) > ct. In this case the solution (Pmax . ., Pmax)
has an associated objective value of ctpmax, which is clearly an upper bound on the objec-
tive. Therefore the solution (Pmax,..., Pmax) is optimal.
CASE 3: Suppose that (i + Itp) (T-t+ 1)> ct and ( _lmax) ( c. \ t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)5
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In this case the solution (pl,. . . pl) cannot be optimal, since we could then increase at least
one of the prices by a small amount (pl < Pmax), and achieve greater revenue by selling the
same number of units ct at a slightly higher average price. However, the previous lemma
suggests that the unique optimal solution (of dimension T - t + 1) has constant prices
p* = (p*, . .. , p*). Furthermore, we know that (/3 + lp* ) (T - t + 1) < ct. Otherwise, as
before, we could increase p* by a small amount and achieve greater revenue by selling the
same number of units ct at a slightly higher price. Since,
( + tpl) (T-t + 1)> ct and (I + /t Pmax) (T -t + 1) < ct,
there exists a price p' such that pl < p' < Pmax and (o +t,lp') (T - t + 1) = ct.
Intuitively, this is the price which will sell off exactly all of the firm's remaining inventory
at the end of the horizon. Now consider the objective function as a function of the static
price p. For Pmin < p < p' the objective is given by ctp (since the firm stocks out before the
end of the planning horizon) which is increasing in p. For pl < p' < p < Pmax the objective
is given by, p (I3 + fip) (T -t + 1). This is true because for these prices the firm does not
stock out early, and each period's revenue is simply the product of price and demand. Now
notice the above function is decreasing for all p > pl. Furthermore, p' satisfies
P (+lp') (T-t+l) =Ctp.
We conclude that p' is the optimal solution in this case. Notice that solving for p' = p* one
obtains,
, c - (T - t + 1) 
(T-t + 1) 
We note that in the deterministic case the policies given by the one and five-dimensional
DPs are equivalent. This follows since in the deterministic case E, = 0 and as a result, the
future demand parameter estimates are not affected by the current pricing decision. Hence,
+:] = ° .I Therefore, the five-dimensional DP can be reduced to the following
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three dimensional DP,
max PT min (o
JT (CT, 4) max PT min {( + J3pT) CT}
fors = t,...,T-l:
J (C5 ? = max ps min -{ (/ + s) cs}
+J+l (cs- min{(T+, P) ,c, 42, )
Moreover, notice that the one-dimensional DP policy in the deterministic case is given by,
JT(CT) = max PT min {(0 + 3tPT) CT}
fors = t,...,T-l:
JS(C) = max Psmin {( + /3tPs) , sC
+Js+l (c, - min { (I + Xi3p'), C})
When the firm uses the five-dimensional DP policy, since in the beginning of period
t, (, ft) = ( / I3), for all s = t,...,T, it follows, just like in the case of the one-
dimensional DP policy, that the current parameter estimates are valid over all future periods.
The DPs solved for both policies are in that case equivalent. The only difference is that
the five-dimensional DP explicitly treats t° and t as (constant) states while the one-
dimensional DP implicitly treats to0 and /3 as (constant) states. This observation leads us
to conclude that the two policies are equivalent.
The Myopic Pricing Policy
Finally, we introduce the last heuristic pricing policy, the myopic pricing policy. This
policy maximizes the expected current period revenue over each period, without considering
future implications of the pricing decisions. In period t (t = 1, 2, ... , T)
Pt C argmax pEe, [min{(o +tlp+t) + t}]
where a+ = max(a, 0). Quantity ct denotes the remaining capacity in the beginning
of period t. Clearly the myopic policy is suboptimal since it does not take into account
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the number of periods left in the planning horizon. However, when capacity is sufficiently
large the expected revenue obtained through the myopic and the one-dimensional DP policy
become the same. This follows from the observation that when capacity is sufficiently large,
both methods maximize current expected revenue. This myopic approach is optimal since
the firm does not run the risk of stocking out before the end of the planning horizon that
is, there are no future implications of the current pricing decision.
2.5 Computational Results
In the previous subsections we introduced dynamic pricing policies for revenue maximization
with incomplete demand information based on DP (one, five and eight dimensional) as well
as a myopic policy which we consider as a benchmark. We have implemented all methods
except the eight-dimensional DP, which is outside today's computational capabilities.
We consider an example where true demand is given by dt = 60 - pt + Et, with st = 0
initially and st N(0, a2), where a = 4. The prices belong in the set P = {20, 21,.. ., 40},
the total capacity is c = 400 and the time horizon is T = 20. As we discussed in the previous
subsections we consider a linear model for estimating the demand, that is, dt = + Opt.
We first assume a model of demand assuming that Et = 0, and we apply both the myopic
and the one-dimensional DP policies, which is optimal in this case. In order to show the
effect of demand learning we we plot in Figures 1 and 2 the least squares estimates of the
intercept 0 and the slope /0. We notice that the estimates of the demand parameters
indeed tend to the true demand parameters over time.
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Figure 2: The estimate ,3.
In Table 1, we compare the total revenue and average price from the myopic and the one-
dimensional DP policies, over 1,000 simulation runs. In general, as we mentioned earlier,
for very large capacities both policies lead to the same revenue.
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T = 20, c = 400 Myopic 1-dim. DP
Ave (Total Revenue) 12,194 15,688
Std (Total Revenue) 1,162.9 303.595
Ave(Ave Price) 30.9367 39.3595
Std (Ave Price) 2.8097 .6506
Table 1: Comparison of total revenue and average price for the myopic and the one-
dimensional DP policies for st = 0, over 1000 simulation runs with T = 20 and c = 400.
T = 5, c = 125 Myopic 1-dim DP 5-Dim DP
Ave.(Total Revenue) 3,884.6 4, 250.1 4, 339.3
Std (Total Revenue) 302.6 282.0 394.2
Ave.(Ave Price) 32.5 35.7 36.7
Std (Ave Price) 2.5 1.8 1.89
Table 2: Comparison of total revenue and average price for the myopic, the one-dimensional
and five-dimensional DP policies for ct N(0, 16), over 1000 simulation runs with T = 5
and c = 125.
The results of Table 1 suggest that the one-dimensional DP outperforms the myopic
policy significantly (by 28.65%). Moreover, the results become more dramatic as capacity
drops.
We next consider the case that Et N(0, 16). In Table 2, we report the total revenue
and average price from the myopic, one-dimensional DP and five-dimensional DP policies,
over 1,000 simulation runs.
The results of Table 2 agree with intuition that the more computationally intensive
methods lead to higher revenues. In particular, the one-dimensional DP policy outperforms
the myopic policy (by 9.4%), and the five-dimensional DP policy outperforms the one-
dimensional DP policy (by 2.09%). The results continue to hold for several values of the
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parameters we tested.
Overall, we feel that this example (as well as several others of similar nature) offers the
following insights.
Insights:
1. All the methods we considered succeed in estimating accurately the demand parame-
ters over time.
2. The class of DP policies outperforms the myopic policy. In addition, revenue increases
with higher complexity of the DP method, that is the five-dimensianal DP policy
outperforms the one-dimensional DP policy.
3 Pricing in a Competitive Environment
In this section, we study pricing under competition. In particular, we focus on a market
with two firms competing for a single product in a dynamic environment, in which, the
firm apart from trying to estimate its own demand, it also needs to predict its competitor's
demand and pricing policy. Given the increased uncertainty, we use a more flexible model
of demand, in which the firm considers that its own true demand as well as its competitor's
demand have parameters that are time varying. Models of the type we consider in this
section, were introduced in [5], and have nice asymptotic properties that we review shortly.
Specifically, the firms have total capacity cl and c2 respectively, over a finite time horizon
T. In the beginning of each period t, Firm 1 knows the realizations of its own demand dl,s,
its own prices Pl,s as well as its competitor's prices P2,s, for s = 1,..., t - 1. It does not
directly observe, however, its competitor's demand.
We assume that each firm's true demand is an unknown linear function, where the true
demand parameters are time varying, that is, for firm k = 1, 2 demand is of the form
dk,t = k t + 3ktoP,t + k,tP2,t + 6 k,t,
where the coefficients Pi0t, 1t, P2U vary slowly with time, i.e.,
Ikt- kt+l < 6k(i), k = 1, 2; i = 0, 1, 2; t = 1,...,T - 1.
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This model assumes that demand for each firm k = 1, 2 depends on its own as well as
its competitors current period prices Pl,t, P2,t, unknown parameters 00kt, 0kt, P2t, and a
random noise k,t N(0, a kt),  = 1,2. The parameters 6k(i), i = 0,1,2 are prespeci-
fled constants, called volatility parameters, and impose the condition that the coefficients
,0Qk, t PIk&t, 0,t are Lipschitz continuous. For example setting k(i) = 0, for some i, implies
that the ith parameter of the demand is constant in time (this is the usual regression con-
dition).
Firm 's objectives are to estimate its own demand, its competitor's reaction and finally,
set its own prices dynamically in order to maximize its total expected revenue.
The results in [5] suggest that if the true demand is Lipschitz continuous, then the linear
model of demand with time varying parameters we consider will indeed converge to the true
demand. Moreover, the rate of convergence is faster than other alternative models. While
we could use this model in the noncompetitive case of the previous section, it would lead
to very high dimensional DPs that we could not solve exactly.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we present the
firm's demand estimation model. In Section 3.2, we present a model that will allow the firm
to predict its competitor's prices but also a model that the firm performs to set its own
prices. Finally, in Section 3.3 we present some computaional results.
3.1 Demand Estimation
Each firm at time t estimates its own demand to be
Dk,t = dk,t + k,t, k = 1,2
where dk,t is a point estimate of the current period demand and 6 k,t is a random noise for
firm k = 1, 2. The point estimate of the demand in current period t is given by d,t =
^,t + -1 2^0 1 A 2/°O,t+ tPl,t + 2tP2,t and d2,t = __,t + 2p,tP, t p2,t. The parameter estimates are based
on the price and demand realizations in the previous periods.
We assume that the parameter estimates i,t and 2,t that describe how each firm's own
price affects its own demand, are negative. This is a reasonable assumption since it states
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that the demand is decreasing in the firm's own price. Moreover, the parameter estimates
P1tf, 21, are nonnegative, indicating that if the competitor sets for example, high prices
they will increase the firm's own demand.
The firm makes the following distributional assumption on the random noise for each
firm's demand,
Ek,t N(0k,t), where k = 1, 2,
and the demand variance estimated for each firm is,
-- ~(dil, , -'1 _2 22 T= (d1 , - t -/l,tPl,r -1,tP2,r)l't-= t-4
ET= (d2,-, -- 2,tP2, - 2,tPl,)
,2,t = t-4
Notice that for the same reason as in the noncompetitive case, the variance estimates &2
for k = 1, 2, have t - 4 degrees of freedom.
For each firm k = 1, 2 we denote by k = (k,1, !,k,2, -,t-1), where pk,t = (Qt, /,t /b,)-
In order to estimate its own demand Firm 1 solves the following problem.
t-1
minimize4 ldlT- (31,T + 3 1,TP1 + QiP2,T7) 
r=1
subject to 1,- ,+1 < l(i), i = 0, 1, 2 r-= 1, 2 ... , t-2
/14 < 0, P/, > 0.
Note that we impose the constraint that the parameters are varying slowly with time. This
is reflected in the numbers l1(i). Note that this problem can be transformed to a linear
optimization model, which makes it attractive computationally.
Let (,) *, i = 0, 1, 2, r = 1, ..., t - I be an optimal of this problem. Firm 1 would like
now to make an estiamate for the parameters (t, We propose the estimate:
t-1
P1,t= E $) i = 0, 1, 2,
l=t-1-N
that is the new estimate is an average of the estimates of the N previous periods. In
particular, if we choose N = 1, the new estimate is equal to the estimate for the previous
period.
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3.2 Competitor's price prediction and own price setting
In order for Firm 1 to set its own prices in current period t, apart from estimating its own
demand, it also needs to predict how its competitor (Firm 2) will react and set its prices in
period t. The information available to Firm 1 at each time period, includes, apart from the
realizations of its own demand, also the prices each firm has set in all the previous periods.
We will assume that Firm 1 believes that its competitor is also setting prices optimally.
In this case, Firm 1 is confronted with an inverse optimization problem. The reason for
this is that Firm 1 tries to guess the parameters of its competitor's demand (by assuming
it also belongs to a parametric family with unknown parameters) through an optimization
problem that would exploit the actual observed competitor's prices. In what follows, we
will distinguish between the uncapacitated and the capacitated versions of the problem.
Uncapacitated Case
As we mentioned, we assume that Firm I believes that Firm 2 is also a revenue maximizer
and, as a result, solves the optimization problem,
I 0 ^ 1 1 ^2
max P2,-.(/ 3 2,r + T 1,T -/ 3 2,rP2,T), T = 1, ... P2,r
This problem has a closed form solution of the form
-2- 12 7 ... ,t.p2,r 2
Price pl, denotes what Firm 's estimate is of what Firm 2 believes for Firm 's pricing.
Examples of such estimates include: pl, = P1,r, Pl,, = pl,r-l, or an average of price
realizations from several periods prior to period T.
Firm 1 will then estimate the demand parameters for Firm 2 by solving the following
optimization problem
t-1 42 , + 21 1
,32 =1 + /32,
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subject to - < 62 (i) i = 0, 1,2, = 1,2,..., t - 2,
2 > °, 32,2 < 0.
As in the model for estimating the current period demand for Firm 1, 62 (i), i = 0, 1, 2,
are volatility parameters that we assume to be to  prespecified constants. The solutions (2,)*,
i = 0, 1, 2, of this optimization model allow Firm 1 to estimate its competitor's current
period demand by setting:
t-1
l=t-1-N
Myopic Own Price Setting Policy
After the previous analysis, Firm l's own price setting problem follows easily. We assume
that Firm 1 sets its prices by maximizing its current period t revenues. That is,
^0 '"1 A2
max P1,t .(lt - -1,tPl -/31,tP2,tPi ,t
This optimization model uses the estimates of the parameters 1i1t, i = 0, 1, 2, that we
described in Firm 1's own demand estimation problem, as well as the prediction of the
competitor's price fi2,t = z23.1 +tP11 Notice that this latter part also involves the estimates
-20,t
of the demand parameters /2t, i = 0, 1, 2 arising through the inverse optimization problem
in the competitor's price prediction problem.
Capacitated Case
We assume that both firms face a total capacity cl and c2 respectively that they need to
allocate in the total time horizon. As before, Firm 1 makes the behavioral assumption that
Firm 2 is also a revenue maximizer. Using the notation x+ = max(0, z), the price prediction
problem that Firm 1 solves for predicting its competitor's prices becomes
P2,t = arg max p min t + ,tP2,t + ,, c -, (2, + / 2 P2,T P,) +p~~~~~pc ~ t
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As in the uncapacitated case, pl,T denotes Firm 's estimate of what Firm 2 assumes for
Firm 's own pricing. Examples include: P1i, = PiT, or P1,r-1, or considering an average of
the prices Firm 1 sets in several previous periods. We can now estimate Firm 2's demand
parameters through the following optimization model
t-1
min > IP2,T - P2,rl
r=1
subject to I 2, - 2 , +l1 52(i), i=0,1, 2, =1, 2 ,...,t - 2
fl,> 0, _< 0,
,t2,t /2,tlt ,where P2,t C arg maxpEp2 p min {(4 t+32,tP+/3I2,Pl,t), C2t}.
Let (/32,T)*, i = 0,1, 2, r = 1, ..., t -1 be optimal solutions to this optimization problem.
As before, Firm 1 estimates its competitor's current period demand parameters as
t-11
2,t = y 2 (/32,)*, i= 0,1,2.
l=t-1-N
Myopic Own Price Setting Policy
After computing its own and its competitor's demand parameter estimates and estab-
lishing a prediction on the price of its competitor for the current period, Firm 1 is ready to
set its own current period price. As in the uncapacitated case, Firm 1 solves the current
period revenue maximization problem, that is,
pl,t C arg max min { t 0,tP + ,t2t) Cl,t},
where ci,t = c1-Z-=1l d1, is Firm 1's remaining capacity in period t. Moreover, the demand
parameters /3 1, = 4 Ct- 1 N(3 * t Q = 4Zl-N(/3 )* i = 0, 1, 2, and finally,N k - 1 Elt--N0 2,11
the estimates of the competitor's prices are Pi2,t e arg maxpE 2 p min { (it + i 2,t 2,t ) 2t}
3.3 Computational Results
We consider two firms competing for one product. The true models of demand for the two
firms respectively are as follows:
dl,t = 50 - .05p1,t .03P2,t + eit
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Firm 1 Firm 2 1 Avg(Rev) 2 Avg(Rev) 1 Std(Rev) 2 Std(Rev)
Opt Rand 3,126,000 2,909,200 70,076 109,790
Rand Rand 2,638,800 2,616,900 63,112 61,961
Match Rand 2,602,700 2,603,200 117,470 123,070
Opt Match 3,791,100 3,779,400 177,540 197,370
Rand Match 2,603,200 2,602,700 123,070 117,470
Opt Opt 3,757,700 3,804,700 70,577 129,530
Rand Opt 2,909,200 3,126,000 109,790 70,076
Match Opt 3,779,400 3,791,100 197,370 177,540
Table 3: A comparison of revenues under random, matching, optimization based pricing
policies.
d2,t = 50 + .03pl,t - .05P2,t + E2,t
where the et, e2,t ~ N(0, 16). Moreover, the prices for both firms range in the sets Pi =
P2 = [100, 900], the time horizon is T = 150 and finally we assume that P1,1 = P2,1 = 500.
Finally, we assume an uncapacitated setting.
We compare three pricing policies: (a) random pricing, (b) price matching, and (c) op-
timization based pricing using the methods we outlined in this section. A firm employing
the random pricing policy chooses a price at random from the feasible price set. In partic-
ular, we consider a discrete uniform distribution over the set of integers [100, 900]. A firm
employing the price matching policy sets, in the current period, the price its competitor
set in the previous period. Finally, a firm employing optimization based pricing first solves
the demand estimation problem in order to estimate its current period parameter estimates
using linear programming, supposes its competitor will repeat its previous period pricing
decision, and then uses myopic pricing in order to set its prices. In Table 3, we report the
revenue from the three strategies, over 1000 simulation runs.
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In order to obtain intuition from Table 3, we fix the strategy the competitor is using,
and then see the effect on revenue of the policy followed by Firm 1. If Firm 2 is using the
random pricing policy, it is clear that Firm 1 has a significant increase in revenue by using
an optimization based policy. Similarly, if Firm 2 is using a matching policy, again the
optimization based policy leads to significant improvements in revenue. Finally, if Firm 2
is using an optimization based policy, then the matching policy is slightly better than the
optimization based policy. However, given that the margin is small and given the variability
in the estimation process, it might still be possible for the optimization based policy to be
stronger. It is thus fair to say, that at least in this example, no matter what policy Firm 2
is using, Firm 1 seems to be better off by using an optimization based policy.
4 Conclusions
We introduced models for dynamic pricing in an oligopolistic market. We first studied mod-
els in a noncompetitive environment in order to understand the effects of demand learning.
By considering the framework of dynamic programming with incomplete state information
for jointly estimating the demand and setting prices for a firm, we proposed increasingly
more computationally intensive algorithms that outperform myopic policies. Our overall
conclusion is that dynamic programming models based on incomplete information are ef-
fective in jointly estimating the demand and setting prices for a firm.
We then studied pricing in a competitive environment. We introduced a more sophis-
ticated model of demand learning in which the price elasticity is a slowly varying function
of time. This allows for increased flexibility in the modeling of the demand. We outlined
methods based on optimization for jointly estimating the Firm's own demand, its com-
petitor's demand, and setting prices. In preliminary computational work, we found that
optimization based pricing methods offer increased revenue for a firm independently of the
policy the competitor firm is following.
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